Marek Pycia

Assistant Professor of Economics, UCLA

9371 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095

pycia-at-ucla-dot-edu

Visiting Associate Research Scholar and Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University

Fisher Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544

__Papers__
Overview
of Research Teaching
__CV__

**Papers are grouped
by topic** (note that three papers are listed under two
topics: matching and auctions).

For the list of papers grouped by
**publication status**, follow this link.

**Matching**

Stability
and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation,
* Econometrica*
80(1),
January 2012, pp. 323–362.

Related
notes: *Econometrica*
Online
Supplement to “Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and
Coalition Formation.”

Non-Existence Result for Matching Games with Transfers,

Matching with Externalities, with M. B. Yenmez.

One-paragraph
abstract published in the *Proceedings
of **The
Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their
Applications.*

Manipulability
of Stable Mechanisms,
with P.
Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. * American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics*,
8(2), May 2016, pp. 202-214

Median
Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with
P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. * Games
and Economic Behavior *97,
May 2016, pp. 64-69

Quantile Stable Mechanisms, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

Part of this paper has been subsumed by Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

**Allocation
and Exchange without Transfers **

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets, with Q. Liu.

REVISION
REQUESTED at the
* Review
of Economic Studies*.

Related notes:

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Multi-Unit-Demand Assignments

Assignment with Multiple-Unit Demands and Responsive Preferences

See the older draft for a small-market characterization of Probabilistic Serial.

Incentive
Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources,
with
U. Unver. Forthcoming in **Theoretical
Economics.**

Supplementary Appendix to “Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources,” with U. Unver.

See older draft for results on outside options and Lorenz dominance.

Related note: Trading Cycles for School Choice, with U. Unver.

Prices and Efficient Assignments Without Transfers, with A. Miralles.

REVISION REQUESTED
at the
**Journal of Economic
Theory.**

The Cost of Ordinality (updated June 2014).

A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities, with Y. He, A. Miralles, and J. Yan.

REVISION
REQUESTED at the **American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics.**

Large vs. Continuum Assignment Economies, with A. Miralles.

REVISION REQUESTED
at **Games
and Economic Behavior.**

Decomposing
Random Mechanisms,
with
Utku Unver, * Journal
of Mathematical Economics *61,
August 2015, pp. 21–33.

Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources, with U. Unver.

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority.

Outside Options in Neutral Discrete Resource Allocation, with U. Unver.

REVISION REQUESTED
at **Social
Choice and Welfare.**

**Auctions
**

Pay-As-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods, with K. Woodward.

Demand
Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,
with
L. Ausubel, P. Cramton, M. Rostek, M. Weretka, * Review
of Economic Studies *81(4),
2014, pp. 1366-1400.

Matching with Externalities, with M. B. Yenmez.

SUBMITTED.
One-paragraph
abstract published in the *Proceedings
of **The
Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their
Applications.*

Manipulability
of Stable Mechanisms,
with P.
Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. * American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics*,
8(2), May 2016, pp. 202-214

Median
Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with
P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. * Games
and Economic Behavior *97,
May 2016, pp. 64-69

Quantile Stable Mechanisms, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

Part of this paper has been subsumed by Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

Stochastic
vs Deterministic Mechanisms in Multidimensional Screening,
my M.Phil. (DEEQA) thesis *Generic
Optimality of Stochastic Mechanisms in Multidimensional Screening*,
with some later additions and edits, May 2006.

**Foundations
of Market Design**

Efficient Bilateral Trade, with R. Garratt (updated November 2014).

One-paragraph
abstract published in the *Proceedings
of **The
Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their
Applications. *

Outside
Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture, with
Simon Board, * American
Economic Review*
104(2),
February 2014, pp. 656–671.

Older draft (provides details on search with correlated types).

Directed Search and the Futility of Cheap Talk, with K. Mirkin.

**Behavioral
Economics**

Dynamic
Inconsistency and Self-Control: A Planner-Doer Interpretation,
with
Roland Bénabou, * Economic
Letters* 77(3),
November 2002, pp. 419–424.

**Mathematics
**

**(Selected
Publications Written in My College and High-School Days)**

‘‘Linear
Functional Inequalities,’’ **Dissertationes*** Mathematicae*
438
(2006), 1-62.

‘‘A Short
Proof of the Regularity of *s*-Convex
Functions,’’ **Aeaquationes*** Mathematicae*
61 (2001)

‘‘A
Convolution Inequality,’’ **Aeaquationes*** Mathematicae*
57 (1999), No. 2-3,
185-200.

‘‘Positive
Homogeneous Functionals Related to L^{p}-Norms,’’
with J. Matkowski, * Journal
of Mathematical Analysis and Applications* 200
(1996), 245-253.

‘‘On the
Volume of Convex Hulls of Sets on Spheres,’’ with R. Latała,
**Geometriae*** Dedicata*
63 (1996), 153-157.

‘‘A Proof of
a Conjecture of Bobkov and Houdré,’’ with S. Kwapień i W.
Schachermayer, * Electronic
Communications in Probability* 1
(1996), paper 2.

‘‘On
(α,a)-Convex Functions,’’ with J. Matkowski, **Archiv*** der Mathematik*
64 (1995), 132-138.

‘‘Convex-like
Inequality, Homogeneity and a Characterization of L^{p}-Norm,’’
with J. Matkowski, **Annales*** Polonici
Mathematici* 60
(1995), 221-230.

‘‘On a
General Solution of Finite Order Difference Equations with Constant
Coefficients,’’ **Archivum*** Mathematicum*
28 (1992), 237-240.