Please see my new website at the University of Zurich.





Marek Pycia












Papers       Overview of Research       Teaching        CV

Papers are grouped by topic (note that three papers are listed under two topics: matching and auctions).

For the list of papers grouped by publication status, follow this link.



Matching

Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation, Econometrica 80(1), January 2012, pp. 323362.

Related notes: Econometrica Online Supplement to “Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation.”

Non-Existence Result for Matching Games with Transfers,

Matching with Externalities, with M. B. Yenmez.

One-paragraph abstract published in the Proceedings of The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications.

Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(2), May 2016, pp. 202-214.

Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. Games and Economic Behavior 97, May 2016, pp. 64-69.

Quantile Stable Mechanisms, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

Part of this paper has been subsumed by Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.



Allocation and Exchange without Transfers

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets, with Q. Liu. (updated August 2016)

REVISION REQUESTED at the Review of Economic Studies.

Related notes:

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Multi-Unit-Demand Assignments

Assignment with Multiple-Unit Demands and Responsive Preferences

See the older draft for a small-market characterization of Probabilistic Serial.

Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources, with U. Unver. Forthcoming in Theoretical Economics.

Supplementary Appendix to “Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources,” with U. Unver.

See older draft for results on outside options and Lorenz dominance.

Related note: Trading Cycles for School Choice, with U. Unver.

Prices and Efficient Assignments Without Transfers, with A. Miralles.

REVISION REQUESTED at the Journal of Economic Theory.

The Cost of Ordinality (updated June 2014).

A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities, with Y. He, A. Miralles, and J. Yan.

Forthcoming at the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

Large vs. Continuum Assignment Economies, with A. Miralles.

REVISION REQUESTED at Games and Economic Behavior.

Decomposing Random Mechanisms, with Utku Unver, Journal of Mathematical Economics 61, August 2015, pp. 21–33.

Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources, with U. Unver.

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority, with P. Troyan.

Swaps on Networks.

Outside Options in Neutral Discrete Resource Allocation, with U. Unver.

REVISION REQUESTED at Social Choice and Welfare.



Auctions

Pay-As-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods, with K. Woodward.

Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions, with L. Ausubel, P. Cramton, M. Rostek, M. Weretka, Review of Economic Studies 81(4), 2014, pp. 1366-1400.

Matching with Externalities, with M. B. Yenmez.

SUBMITTED. One-paragraph abstract published in the Proceedings of The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications.

Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(2), May 2016, pp. 202-214.

Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez. Games and Economic Behavior 97, May 2016, pp. 64-69.

Quantile Stable Mechanisms, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

Part of this paper has been subsumed by Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets, with P. Chen, M. Egesdal, and M. B. Yenmez.

Stochastic vs Deterministic Mechanisms in Multidimensional Screening, my M.Phil. (DEEQA) thesis Generic Optimality of Stochastic Mechanisms in Multidimensional Screening, with some later additions and edits, May 2006.



Foundations of Market Design

Efficient Bilateral Trade, with R. Garratt (updated November 2014).

One-paragraph abstract published in the Proceedings of The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications.

Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture, with Simon Board, American Economic Review 104(2), February 2014, pp. 656–671.

Older draft (provides details on search with correlated types).

Directed Search and the Futility of Cheap Talk, with K. Mirkin.



Behavioral Economics

Dynamic Inconsistency and Self-Control: A Planner-Doer Interpretation, with Roland Bénabou, Economic Letters 77(3), November 2002, pp. 419424.



Mathematics

(Selected Publications Written in My College and High-School Days)

‘‘Linear Functional Inequalities,’’ Dissertationes Mathematicae 438 (2006), 1-62.

‘‘A Short Proof of the Regularity of s-Convex Functions,’’ Aequationes Mathematicae 61 (2001), No. 1-2, 128-130.

‘‘A Convolution Inequality,’’ Aequationes Mathematicae 57 (1999), No. 2-3, 185-200.

‘‘Positive Homogeneous Functionals Related to Lp-Norms,’’ with J. Matkowski, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 200 (1996), 245-253.

‘‘On the Volume of Convex Hulls of Sets on Spheres,’’ with R. Latała, Geometriae Dedicata 63 (1996), 153-157.

‘‘A Proof of a Conjecture of Bobkov and Houdré,’’ with S. Kwapień i W. Schachermayer, Electronic Communications in Probability 1 (1996), paper 2.

‘‘On (α,a)-Convex Functions,’’ with J. Matkowski, Archiv der Mathematik 64 (1995), 132-138.

‘‘Convex-like Inequality, Homogeneity and a Characterization of Lp-Norm,’’ with J. Matkowski, Annales Polonici Mathematici 60 (1995), 221-230.

‘‘On a General Solution of Finite Order Difference Equations with Constant Coefficients,’’ Archivum Mathematicum 28 (1992), 237-240.