Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources∗

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Abstract

Efficiency in Pareto sense and strategy-proofness have been the central design desiderata in market design for allocation of discrete resources, such as dorm allocation, school choice, and kidney exchange. However, more precise efficiency objectives, such as welfare maximization, have been neglected. In a setting where heterogenous indivisible goods are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we use Arrovian efficiency as the notion of welfare optimization and show that a mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian-efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function, if and only if the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Moreover, if an Arrovian social welfare function gives a complete ranking over all matchings for every problem, then we show that the individually strategy-proof mechanism that chooses its best outcome for every problem needs to be in class of mechanisms that we call almost sequential dictatorships.

Keywords: Individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, Arrovian preference aggregation, matching, no-transfer allocation and exchange, single-unit demand.

JEL classification: C78, D78

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1 Introduction

Microeconomic theory has informed the design of many markets and other institutions. Recently, many new mechanisms have been proposed to allocate resources in environments in which agents have single-unit demands and transfers are not used, or are prohibited. These environments found applications recently in the allocation and exchange of transplant organs, such as kidneys (cf. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2004); allocation of school seats in Boston, New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco (cf. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003); and allocation of dormitory rooms at US colleges (cf. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999).

The central concerns in the development of allocation mechanisms are incentives and efficiency.\(^1\) Many of these mechanisms function by elicitation of ordinal information about preferences, because it is more practical. Moreover, theoretically cardinal information about preferences does not have much meaning in environments without monetary transfers and strategy-proofness makes cardinal information irrelevant. Therefore, Pareto efficiency or its constrained versions has been the main goal of design along with incentive compatibility. A matching is Pareto efficient if there exists no other matching that makes everybody weakly better off and at least one agent strictly better off.

However, Pareto efficiency is a weak efficiency concept. While interpersonal utility comparisons are not needed for Pareto efficiency as desired, it only gives a lower bound for what can be achieved through desirable mechanisms. One way of strengthening Pareto efficiency is requiring an efficient matching to be the maximum of a social ranking of matchings, in line with Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), and Arrow’s (1963) reformulation of welfare economics.\(^2\) To formulate this more demanding efficiency criterion, we define a social welfare function (SWF) to be a mapping from profiles of agents’ preferences over matchings to partial strict orderings of matchings. We allow partial orderings — such as Pareto dominance — and also derive results for complete orderings.\(^3\) We require that each SWF satisfies the

\(^{\dagger}\)For instance, Bogolomania and Moulin (2004) discuss “a recent flurry of papers on the deterministic assignment of indivisible goods” and state that “the central question of that literature is to characterize the set of efficient and incentive compatible (strategy-proof) assignment mechanisms.” The prior theoretical literature on single-unit-demand allocation without transfers has focused on characterizing mechanisms that are strategy-proof and efficient alongside other properties (see below for examples of such characterizations). In contrast, our characterization of strategy-proofness and efficiency does not rely on additional assumptions.

\(^2\)Pareto efficiency is, on one hand, the baseline efficiency requirement, and on the other hand, it does not indicate which of the possibly many Pareto-efficient matchings to choose. For instance, Arrow (1963), pp. 36-37, discusses the partial ordering of outcomes given by Pareto dominance, and observes: “But though the study of maximal alternatives is possibly a useful preliminary to the analysis of particular social welfare functions, it is hard to see how any policy recommendations can be based merely on a knowledge of maximal alternatives. There is no way of deciding which maximal alternative to decide on.”

\(^3\)See e.g. Sen (1970,1999) and Weymark (1984) for analysis of welfare with partial orderings. Our main results would remain unchanged if we formulated the efficiency requirement in terms of social choice functions satisfying the Pareto condition and the irrelevance of independent alternatives.
Pareto and independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives postulates (Arrow, 1963): (i) a SWF is Pareto if it ranks any matching strictly below any other matching that Pareto dominates it, and (ii) a SWF satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives if, given any two profiles of preferences and any two matchings that are socially comparable under both profiles, if all agents rank the two matchings in the same way under both profiles, then the social ranking of the two matchings is the same under both profiles. We call a mechanism Arrovian efficient with respect to a SWF if, for all preference profiles, the resulting matching is the unique maximum of the SWF.\footnote{There is a rich social choice literature on the correspondence between choice and the maximum of the SWF ranking in the context of social choice (see below). This literature is interested in rationalizing social choice rather than efficiency of allocation mechanisms, and hence it says that a mechanism, or social choice, is “rationalized by a SWF” rather than “efficient with respect to a SWF.”} For shortness we say that a mechanism is Arrovian efficient if it is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF.

Our model setup is standard. In each economy, there is a finite number of agents and indivisible objects, dubbed as “houses” (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). Each agent has a strict preference relation over houses, which is private information. Beliefs of agents over the preferences of other agents are distribution-free. A matching is the outcome of an economy: each agent is matched with a house and no house is matched with two different agents.

As our first main result (Theorem 1) we show that mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, if and only it is Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof. It would be good to define the other fundamental notions we use: A mechanism is individually strategy-proof if there does not exist any economy (i.e., problem) such that at least one agent can improve above his assignment if he reports an untruthful preference relation. A mechanism is group strategy-proof if there does not exist any economy such that there exist a subset of agents (i.e., a group) who can jointly report some preferences such that every agent in this group receives a weakly better outcome and at least one agent in the group receives a strictly better outcome with respect to the case when all in the group reported their true preferences.

Pycia and Ünver (2015) has recently characterized the class of group-strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanisms in this environment. The class of trading cycles mechanisms fully gives this class. Using this result and our first result, we show that almost sequential dictatorships are the only mechanisms that are individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient with respect to a SWF that always generates complete orderings as long as the number of houses are more than agents.

A sequential dictatorship is a mechanism defined through a sequential algorithm and a tree graph with agents as vertices and houses as edges. In each round of the algorithm an agent chooses the best house he likes among the remaining once. Who will choose is in each
round is determined by the tree: The root agent is the first agent to pick, and who will pick next is determined according to the house, which the first agent chose (branch from the root) and so on. The tree can be alternatively represented as a mapping that designates for each round the person who will choose as a function of who chose what before him. We first show that if the number of houses are more than the number of agents than this class is exactly the class of sequential dictatorships (Theorem 2).  

However, if the number of houses are equal to the number of agents then there could be other mechanisms slightly different from a sequential dictatorship. Consider a problem in which there are 2 agents and 2 houses and a top-trading cycles mechanism (TTC) of Pápai (2000) in which one agent owns a house and the other agent owns the other house. This mechanism picks the unique Pareto efficient matching as long as the top choices of the agents disagree and otherwise gives the house ranked first by its owner to its owner and the other house to the other agent. Such TTCs turn out to be also individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient with respect to complete orderings. For larger sets of agents, such TTC mechanisms can be appended to the sequential dictatorship trees. Combining these two mechanism classes defined for house and agent sets of different and equal sizes, respectively, we show that the full class of strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient (for complete rankings) mechanisms are given by almost sequential dictatorships (Theorem 3).

Dictatorships are the benchmark strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in many areas of economics. For instance, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that all strategy-proof and unanimous voting rules are dictatorial. Moreover, for this result to hold we need more than two alternatives. With two alternatives there are other mechanisms, which are strategy-proof and unanimous, very much like our class of almost sequential dictatorships. Still, we find it surprising that this theorem is true in our environment because

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5Sequential dictatorships have not been studied extensively with unit demand for goods, although their special cases have been. In a serial dictatorship (also known as a priority mechanism), the same agent chooses next regardless of which house the current agent picks. Svensson (1994) formally introduced and studied serial dictatorships first; Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998) studied a probabilistic version of them where the order of agents is determined uniformly randomly; Svensson (1999) and Ergin (2000) characterized them using plausible axioms. Recently, under the existence of outside options, Pycia and Ünver (2007) characterized a subclass of sequential dictatorships different from serial dictatorships. With multiple-house demand under responsive preferences, Hatfield (2009) showed that sequential dictatorships are the only strategy-proof, non-bossy, and Pareto-efficient mechanisms.

6Ehlers, Klaus, and Pápai (2002) and Ehlers and Klaus (2003) characterized strategy-proof mechanisms with population and resource monotonicity properties, respectively, as TTC mechanisms in which potentially at most two agents simultaneously own houses in every round of the algorithm. The main difference of almost sequential dictatorships is that this bi-ownership can only happen when there is an equal number of agents and houses only in the last round of the TTC algorithm.

— in contrast to the environments where this question was previously studied — ours allows many individually strategy-proof (and even group strategy-proof) and Pareto efficient mechanisms that are not dictatorial.

Overall this paper falls between literatures on Arrovian preference aggregation (initiated by Arrow, 1963, Arrow’s Theorem) and on strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism design (initiated by Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975, Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem) in different restricted preference and economic domains. Each strand has an extensive literature accumulation of its own. However, as far as we know, this is the first paper that combines mechanism design with Arrovian preference aggregation.

Moreover, the present paper is the first to connect the literature on allocation and exchange of discrete resources and the literature on Arrovian preference aggregation. In particular, we seem to be the first to recognize the equivalence of Theorem 1. However, stronger equivalence results — which do not hold true in our setting — are familiar from studies of voting. In voting — unlike in our problem — all agents have strict preferences among all outcomes. In the class of Pareto efficient mechanisms, individual strategy-proofness is then equivalent to group strategy-proofness (Gibbard, 1973, and Satterthwaite, 1975). This stronger equivalence fails in our setting as it admits individually strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanisms that fail group strategy-proofness.

2 Model

2.1 House Allocation Problems

Let $I$ be a set of agents and $H$ be a set of objects that we often refer to as houses following the standard terminology of the literature. We use letters $i, j, k$ to refer to agents and $h, g, e$ to refer to houses. Each agent $i$ has a strict preference relation over $H$, denoted by $\succ_i$. Let $P_i$ be the set of strict preference relations for agent $i$, and let $P_J$ denote the Cartesian product $\times_{i \in J} P_i$ for any $J \subseteq I$. Any profile from $\succeq = (\succ_i)_{i \in I}$ from $P \equiv P_I$ is called a

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8. The equivalence of Theorem 1 also has counterparts in the social choice literature on restricted preference domains—such as single-peaked preferences—in which there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Arrow efficient rules. For instance, Moulin (1988) extends a result by Blair and Muller (1983) and shows that in environments such as single-peaked voting, if an Arrovian SWF is monotonic, then the mechanism picking its unique maximal element is group strategy-proof. In particular, this implies that in single-peaked voting individual strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent with no need to restrict attention to efficient mechanisms. In contrast, in allocation environments the equivalence results from the conjunction of incentive and efficiency assumptions, and the equivalence of incentive assumptions alone is not true.

9. By $\succeq_i$ we denote the induced weak preference relation; that is, for any $g, h \in H$, $g \succeq_i h \iff g = h$ or $g \succ_i h$. 

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preference profile. For all $\succ \in P$ and all $J \subseteq I$, let $\succ_J = (\succ_i)_{i \in J} \in P_J$ be the restriction of $\succ$ to $J$. A house allocation problem is the triple $\langle I, H, \succ \rangle$ (cf. Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979).

Throughout the paper, we fix $I$ and $H$, and thus, a problem is identified with its preference profile. We follow the tradition adopted by many papers in the literature (cf. Svensson, 1999) and assume that $|H| \geq |I|$ so that each agent is allocated a house.

An outcome of a house allocation problem is a matching. To define a matching, let us start with a more general concept that we will use frequently. A submatching is an allocation of a subset of houses to a subset of agents, such that no two different agents get the same house. Formally, a submatching is a one-to-one function $\sigma : J \rightarrow H$; where for $J \subseteq I$, using the standard function notation, we denote by $\sigma(i)$ the assignment of agent $i \in J$ under $\sigma$, and by $\sigma^{-1}(h)$ the agent that got house $h \in \sigma(J)$ under $\sigma$. Let $\mathcal{S}$ be the set of submatchings. For each $\sigma \in \mathcal{S}$, let $I_{\sigma}$ denote the set of agents matched by $\sigma$ and $H_{\sigma} \subseteq H$ denote the set of houses matched by $\sigma$. For all $h \in H$, let $\mathcal{S}_{-h} \subset \mathcal{S}$ be the set of submatchings $\sigma \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $h \in H - H_{\sigma}$, i.e., the set of submatchings at which house $h$ is unmatched. In virtue of the set-theoretic interpretation of functions, submatchings are sets of agent-house pairs, and are ordered by inclusion. A matching is a maximal submatching; that is, $\mu \in \mathcal{S}$ is a matching if $I_{\mu} = I$. Let $\mathcal{M} \subset \mathcal{S}$ be the set of matchings. We will write $I_{\sigma}$ for $I - I_{\sigma}$, and $H_{\sigma}$ for $H - H_{\sigma}$ for short. We will also write $\mathcal{M}$ for $\mathcal{S} - \mathcal{M}$.

A mechanism is a mapping $\varphi : P \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ that assigns a matching for each preference profile (or, equivalently, for each allocation problem).\(^{10}\)

2.2 Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency

A mechanism is individually strategy-proof if truthful revelation of preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for any agent: a mechanism $\varphi$ is individually strategy-proof if for all $\succ \in P$, there is no $i \in I$ and $\succ'_i \in P_i$ such that

$$\varphi[\succ'_i, \succ - i](i) \succ_i \varphi[\succ](i).$$

A mechanism is group strategy-proof if there is no group of agents that can misstate their preferences in a way such that each one in the group gets a weakly better house, and at least one agent in the group gets a strictly better house, irrespective of the preference ranking of the agents not in the group. Formally, a mechanism $\varphi$ is group strategy-proof if for all agents not in the group.

\(^{10}\)We study direct mechanisms.
there exists no $J \subseteq I$ and $\succ'_J \in P_J$ such that

$$\varphi[\succ'_J, \succ_J](i) \succeq_i \varphi[\succ](i) \text{ for all } i \in J,$$

and

$$\varphi[\succ'_J, \succ_J](j) \succ_j \varphi[\succ](j) \text{ for at least one } j \in J.$$

A matching is Pareto efficient if no other matching would make everybody weakly better off, and at least one agent strictly better off. That is, a matching $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$ is Pareto efficient if there exists no matching $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$ such that for all $i \in I$, $\nu(i) \succeq_i \mu(i)$, and for some $i \in I$, $\nu(i) \succ_i \mu(i)$. A mechanism is Pareto efficient if it finds a Pareto-efficient matching for every problem.

Pareto efficiency is a weak efficiency requirement. In order to define the stronger concept of Arrovian efficiency with respect to a social welfare function, denote by $P^\mathcal{M}$ the set of strict partial orderings over matchings; we refer to elements of $P^\mathcal{M}$ as social rankings. A social welfare function (SWF) $\Phi : P \rightarrow P^\mathcal{M}$ maps agents’ preference profiles to social rankings. If a matching $\mu$ is ranked higher than some other matching $\nu$ under $\Phi(\succ)$, we denote this as $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$. A SWF $\Phi$ is Pareto (or unanimous) if: for every preference profile $\succ$ and any two matchings $\mu, \nu \in \mathcal{M}$, if $\mu(i) \succeq_i \nu(i)$ for all $i \in I$, with at least one preference strict, then $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$. A SWF $\Phi$ satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives if: for all $\succ, \succ' \in P$ and all $\mu, \nu \in \mathcal{M}$, if all agents rank $\mu$ and $\nu$ in the same way and both $\Phi(\succ)$ and $\Phi(\succ')$ rank $\mu$ and $\mu'$ then $\mu \Phi(\succ') \nu \iff \mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$. We restrict attention to SWFs that satisfy the Pareto and independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives postulates. Notice that Pareto dominance is a standard example of a SWF.

A matching $\mu$ is Arrovian efficient with respect to a social ranking $\Phi(\succ)$ if it maximizes the social welfare, that is $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$ for all $\nu \in \mathcal{M}\setminus\{\mu\}$. A mechanism $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient with respect to a SWF $\Phi$ if for any profile of agents’ preferences $\succ$, the matching $\phi(\succ)$ is Arrovian efficient with respect to $\Phi(\succ)$. If $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF, we simply say that it is Arrovian efficient. The next section offers two examples illustrating the concept of Arrovian efficiency.

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11In particular, when imposed on group strategy-proof mechanisms, Pareto efficiency is equivalent to assuming that the mechanism maps $P$ onto the entire set of matchings $\mathcal{M}$. This surjectivity property is known as citizen sovereignty, or full range.
3 Equivalence

In Theorem 1, we establish the equivalence between two concepts. In addition, Example 1 below demonstrates that the class of individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms is a strict superset of the mechanisms satisfying any of the equivalent conditions of the theorem.

**Theorem 1.** A mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient if and only if it is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient.

To illustrate this equivalence and our concepts let us look at the setting with three agents 1, 2, and 3, three houses A, B, and C, and no outside options. Consider the following two examples of mechanisms.

**Example 1.** The serial dictatorship in which 1 chooses first, and 2 chooses second is well-known to be group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. It is straightforward to see that this serial dictatorship is Arrovian efficient with respect to the following SWF: \( \mu \) is ranked strictly above \( \nu \) if and only if (a) 1 strictly prefers \( \mu \) to \( \nu \), or (b) 1 is indifferent and 2 strictly prefers \( \mu \) to \( \nu \).

**Example 2.** Let us now modify the serial dictatorship of the previous example and consider mechanisms \( \psi \) in which 1 chooses first; then 2 chooses second if 1 prefers B over C, else 3 chooses second. This mechanism is an example of a ranking-dependent sequential dictatorship, and is also individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. However, mechanism \( \psi \) is neither Arrovian efficient nor group strategy-proof. To see the latter point let us look at the following two preference profiles:

\[
\succ = \begin{array}{ccc}
1 & 2 & 3 \\
A & A & A \\
B & B & B \\
C & C & C \\
\end{array}
\quad \quad \quad \quad \succ' = \begin{array}{ccc}
1 & 2 & 3 \\
A & A & A \\
C & B & B \\
B & C & C \\
\end{array}
\]

Notice that

\[
\psi[\succ] = \{(1, A), (2, B), (3, C)\},
\psi[\succ'] = \{(1, A), (2, C), (3, B)\}.
\]

The mechanism \( \psi \) fails group strategy-proofness. For instance, when the true preference profile is \( \succ \), then agents 1 and 3 have a profitable manipulation \( \{\succ\}_{\{1,3\}} \). The mechanism
ψ also fails Arrovian efficiency. Indeed, by way of contradiction assume that ψ is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF Ψ. Then, Ψ (≻) ranks allocation ψ[≻] strictly above ψ[≻'], and Ψ (≻') ranks ψ[≻'] strictly above ψ[≻]. But, this violates the independence of the irrelevant alternatives, a contradiction that shows that ψ is not Arrovian efficient.

The proof of Theorem 1 builds on Example 1. As a preparation for the proof, let us notice three properties of group strategy-proofness. First, in the environment we study group strategy-proofness is equivalent to the conjunction of two non-cooperative properties: individual strategy-proofness and non-bossiness.\textsuperscript{12} Non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) means that no agent can misreport his preferences in such a way that his allocation is not changed but the allocation of some other agent is changed: a mechanism ϕ is \textbf{non-bossy} if for all ≻ ∈ P, there is no i ∈ I and ≻'_i ∈ P_i such that

ϕ[≻'_i, ≻' − i](i) = ϕ[≻](i) and ϕ[≻'_i, ≻' − i] ≠ ϕ[≻].

The following lemma is due to Pápai (2000):

\textbf{Lemma 1.} Pápai (2000) A mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is individually strategy-proof and non-bossy.

Second, in the environment we study group strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999). A mechanism ϕ is \textbf{Maskin monotonic} if ϕ[≻'] = ϕ[≻] whenever ≻' ∈ P is a ϕ-monotonic transformation of ≻ ∈ P. A preference profile ≻' ∈ P is a ϕ-\textbf{monotonic transformation} of ≻ ∈ P if

\{h ∈ H : h ≽_i, ϕ[≻](i)\} ⊇ \{h ∈ H : h ≽'_i ϕ[≻](i)\} for all i ∈ I.

Thus, for each agent, the set of houses better than the base-profile allocation weakly shrinks when we go from the base profile to its monotonic transformation. The following lemma was proven by Takamiya (2001) for a subset of the problems we study; his proof can be extended to our more general setting.

\textbf{Lemma 2.} A mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic.

Finally, let us notice the following

\textbf{Lemma 3.} If a mechanism ϕ is group strategy-proof then no agent can change the outcome of ϕ by changing the ranking of houses worse than the house he obtains, that is if ≻' differs from ≻ only in how some agent i ranks houses below ϕ[≻](i) then ϕ[≻'] = ϕ[≻].

\textsuperscript{12}Both of these properties are non-cooperative in the sense that they relate a mechanism’s outcomes under two scenarios when a single agent makes unilateral preference revelation deviations.
We skip the straightforward proof of this sequential dictatorship lemma because we later prove, without reliance on this lemma or Theorem 1, a substantially stronger result, Theorem 2.

**Proof of Theorem 1.** First, consider an individually strategy-proof mechanism $\phi$ that is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF $\Phi$. In light of Lemma 1, to establish the first implication it is enough to show that $\phi$ is Pareto efficient and non-bossy.

To show that $\phi$ is Pareto efficient, suppose that for some $\succ \in P$, $\phi[\succ]$ is not Pareto efficient. Then, there exists some $\mu \in M \setminus \{\phi[\succ]\}$ such that $\mu(i) \succeq_i \phi[\succ](i)$ for all $i$, with a strict preference for at least one agent. Because $\Phi$ satisfies the Pareto postulate, we have $\mu \Phi(\succ) \phi[\succ]$, which contradicts the assumption that $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient with respect to $\Phi$.

To show that $\phi$ is non-bossy, let $\succ \in P$ and $\succ' \in P$ be such that

$$\phi[\succ](i) = \phi[\succ', \succ - i](i).$$

Denote $\succ' = (\succ'_1, \succ'_2)$. Because $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient with respect to $\Phi$, the matching $\phi[\succ]$ is ranked as the unique first by $\Phi(\succ)$ and the matching $\phi[\succ']$ is ranked as the unique first by $\Phi(\succ')$. Thus, $\phi[\succ]$ and $\phi[\succ']$ are comparable under both $\Phi(\succ)$ and $\Phi(\succ')$, and independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that $\phi[\succ]$ and $\phi[\succ']$ are ranked in the same way by $\Phi(\succ)$ and $\Phi(\succ')$. We, thus, conclude that $\phi[\succ] = \phi[\succ']$. This establishes that $\phi$ is non-bossy.

Second, consider a group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism $\phi$. We define the SWF $\Phi$ as follows: for any profile of preferences $\succ$ and any matchings $\mu$ and $\mu' \neq \mu$, matching $\mu$ is ranked by $\Phi(\succ)$ above $\mu'$ iff either (i) we have $\mu = \phi[\succ]$ or (ii) for all agents $i$, we have $\mu(i) \succeq_i \mu'(i)$. Note that Pareto efficiency of $\phi$ implies that conditions (i) and (ii) are consistent with each other, and hence, that the SWF $\Phi$ is well-defined.

By definition, $\Phi$ satisfies the Pareto postulate. Furthermore, $\Phi$ is transitive: if $\Phi(\succ)$ ranks $\mu^1$ above $\mu^2$ and it ranks $\mu^2$ above $\mu^3$ then it ranks $\mu^1$ above $\mu^3$. Indeed, if one of the $\mu^\ell$ (for $\ell = 1, 2, 3$) equals $\phi[\succ]$, then it must be that $\mu^1 = \phi[\succ]$ and the claim is proved. If none of the $\mu^i$ equals $\phi[\succ]$, then agents unanimously rank $\mu^1$ above $\mu^2$ and unanimously rank $\mu^2$ above $\mu^3$; we can conclude that the agents unanimously rank $\mu^1$ above $\mu^3$ and thus $\Phi(\succ)$ ranks $\mu^1$ above $\mu^3$.

It remains to check that $\Phi$ satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Take two preference profiles $\succ^1$ and $\succ^2$ such that each agent ranks two matchings, say $\mu$ and $\mu'$, in the same way under the two preference profiles. If the two matchings are comparable under both $\Phi(\succ^1)$ and $\Phi(\succ^2)$, then one of the following cases obtains:

Case 1: one of the matchings is unanimously preferred to the other under $\succ^1$, then the
same unanimous preference obtains under $\succ^2$ and the claim is true.

Case 2: there is no unanimous ranking of the two matchings under $\succ^1$; then unanimity cannot obtain under $\succ^2$ either. As the matchings are ranked, it must be that $\phi[\succ^1]$ and $\phi[\succ^2]$ take value in $\{\mu, \mu'\}$. Say, $\phi[\succ^1] = \mu$; then we need to check that $\phi[\succ^2] = \mu$ as well. By Lemma 2, we can assume that each agent $i$ ranks $\mu(i)$ and $\mu'(i)$ at the top of his ranking under both $\succ^1$ and $\succ^2$. Furthermore, by Lemma 3 only rankings of houses above agents’ allocations (and including their allocations) affect the outcome of a group strategy-proof mechanism; we can thus conclude that $\phi[\succ^1] = \phi[\succ^2]$. QED

For our next section when we consider complete SCFs, we need to introduce the full class of group-strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanisms, as characterized by Pycia and Ünver (2015). This is the class of trading cycles mechanisms. This mechanism class is defined through an iterative algorithm, which matches some agents in every round. Depending on who is matched with which house in preceding rounds, the remaining houses are controlled by the remaining agents in a round of the algorithm. We define a control right structure as a function of the submatching that is fixed:

**Definition 1.** A structure of control rights is a collection of mappings

$$\{(c, b) : H_\sigma \to T_\sigma \times \{\text{ownership, brokerage}\}\}_{\sigma \in \mathcal{M}}.$$  

The functions $c_\sigma$ of the control rights structure tell us which unmatched agent controls any particular unmatched house at a submatching $\sigma$, where at $\sigma$ is the terminology we use when some agents and houses are already matched with respect to $\sigma$. Agent $i$ controls house $h \in H_\sigma$ at submatching $\sigma$ when $c_\sigma(h) = i$. The type of control is determined by functions $b_\sigma$. We say that the agent $c_\sigma(h)$ owns $h$ at $\sigma$ if $b_\sigma(h) = \text{ownership}$, and that the agent $c_\sigma(h)$ brokers $h$ at $\sigma$ if $b_\sigma(h) = \text{brokerage}$. In the former case we call the agent an owner and the controlled house an owned house. In the latter case we use the terms broker and brokered house. Notice that each controlled (owned or brokered) house is unmatched at $\sigma$, and any unmatched house is controlled by some uniquely determined unmatched agent. We need to impose certain conditions on the control rights structures to guarantee the induced mechanisms to be group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient.

**Definition 2.** A structure of control rights $(c, b)$ is consistent if the following within-round and across-round requirement are satisfied for all $\sigma \in \mathcal{M}$:

**Within-Round Requirements:**

(R1) There is at most one brokered house at $\sigma$ or $|H_\sigma| = 3$ and all remaining houses are brokered.
(R2) If $i$ is the only unmatched agent at $\sigma$ then $i$ owns all unmatched houses at $\sigma$.

(R3) If agent $i$ brokers a house at $\sigma$, then $i$ does not control any other houses at $\sigma$.

Across-Round Requirements: Consider submatching $\sigma'$ such that $\sigma \subset \sigma' \in \mathcal{M}$, and an agent $i \in I_{\sigma'}$ that owns a house $h \in H_{\sigma'}$ at $\sigma$. Then:

(R4) Agent $i$ owns $h$ at $\sigma'$.

(R5) If $i'$ brokers house $h'$ at $\sigma$ and $i' \in I_{\sigma'}$, $h' \in H_{\sigma'}$ then either $i'$ brokers $h'$ at $\sigma'$, or $i$ owns $h'$ at $\sigma'$. (Notice that the latter case can only happen if $i$ is the only agent in $I_{\sigma'}$ who owns a house at $\sigma$.)

(R6) If agent $i' \in I_{\sigma'}$ controls $h' \in H_{\sigma'}$ at $\sigma$, then $i'$ owns $h$ at $\sigma \cup \{(i,h')\}$.

Each consistent control rights structure $(c,b)$ induces a trading cycles (TC) mechanism $\psi^{c,b}$, and given a problem $\triangleright \in \mathcal{P}$, the outcome matching $\psi^{c,b}[\triangleright]$ is found as follows:

The TC algorithm. The algorithm starts with empty submatching $\sigma^0 = \emptyset$ and in each round $r = 1, 2, \ldots$ it matches some agents with houses. By $\sigma^{r-1}$ we denote the submatching of agents matched before round $r$. If $\sigma^{r-1} \in \mathcal{M}$, then the algorithm proceeds with the following three steps of round $r$:

Step 1. Pointing. Each house $h \in H_{\sigma^{r-1}}$ points to the agent who controls it at $\sigma^{r-1}$. Each agent $i \in I_{\sigma^{r-1}}$ points to his most preferred outcome in $H_{\sigma^{r-1}}$.

Step 2(a). Matching Simple Trading Cycles. A cycle

$$h^1 \rightarrow i^1 \rightarrow h^2 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow h^n \rightarrow i^n \rightarrow h^1$$

in which $n \in \{1, 2, \ldots\}$ and agents $i^\ell \in I_{\sigma^{r-1}}$ point to houses $h^{\ell+1} \in H_{\sigma^{r-1}}$ and houses $h^\ell$ point to agents $i^\ell$ (here $\ell = 1, \ldots, n$ and superscripts are added modulo $n$) is simple when one of the agents is an owner. Each agent in each simple trading cycle is matched with the house he is pointing to.

Step 2(b). Forcing Brokers to Downgrade Their Pointing. If there are no simple trading cycles in the preceding Step 2(a), and only then, we proceed as follows (otherwise we proceed to step 3).
• If there is a cycle in which a broker \( i \) points to a brokered house, and there is another broker or owner that points to this house, then we force broker \( i \) to point to his next choice and we return to Step 2(a).\(^{13}\)

• Otherwise, we clear all trading cycles by matching each agent in each cycle with the house he is pointing to.

\textit{Step 3.} Submatching \( \sigma^r \) is defined as the union of \( \sigma^{r-1} \) and the set of newly matched agent-house pairs. When all agents or all houses are matched under \( \sigma^r \), then the algorithm terminates and gives matching \( \sigma^r \) as its outcome.

One important feature of the TC mechanisms is that we can without loss of generality rule out existence of brokers at some submatching \( \sigma \) if there is a single owner at \( \sigma \). We formalize this property as a remark:

\textbf{Remark 1.} Pycia and Ünver (2015) For each TC mechanism such that for some \( \sigma \) there is only one owner and one broker, there is an equivalent TC mechanism such that at \( \sigma \) there are no brokers and the same owner owns all houses.

Using Theorem 1 and Pycia and Ünver (2015)’s characterization we obtain the following corollary:

\textbf{Corollary 1.} A mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient if and only if it is a TC mechanism.

4 Complete Social Welfare Functions

Our first main result shows that the class of individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient mechanisms is exactly the class of group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. In this result, we allowed welfare functions to incompletely rank social outcomes. We now show that a class that we refer to as almost sequential dictatorships are exactly the mechanisms that are strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient with respect to complete SWF, that is SWF that always rank all outcomes.

First we define the following class: a \textbf{top-trading-cycles (TTC)} (or \textit{hierarchical exchange}) mechanism is a TC mechanism with a control right structure in which no house is ever brokered at any submatching (Pápai, 2000). A TTC mechanism \( \psi^{c,b} \) will be denoted by dropping \( b \) from its notation as \( \psi^c \).

TTC mechanisms form a strict subclass of TC mechanisms. Let us start with an example showing that not all TTC are efficient with respect to a complete SWF.

\(^{13}\text{Importantly, broker } i \text{ is unique by R1.}\)
Example 3. When $|H| > |I| = 2$, an agent cannot own two houses while a second agent owns a house: Consider allocating three houses to two agents. Let $\phi$ be a top-trading-cycles mechanism in which agent 1 owns house $A$ and agent 2 owns houses $B$ and $C$. We will show that there is no complete SWF such that $\phi$ is efficient.

Consider the preference profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y$</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consider also the following four additional preference profiles

$y^1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ B & C \\ A & : \\ : & : \end{pmatrix}$, $y^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ B & B \\ C & C \\ : & : \end{pmatrix}$, $y^3 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ C & A \\ A & : \\ : & : \end{pmatrix}$, $y^4 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ A & A \\ C & C \\ : & : \\ : & : \end{pmatrix}$

Denote

$\mu^1 = \phi[y^1] = \{(1, B), (2, C)\}$, $\mu^2 = \phi[y^2] = \{(1, C), (2, B)\}$, $\mu^3 = \phi[y^3] = \{(1, C), (2, A)\}$, $\mu^4 = \phi[y^4] = \{(1, A), (2, C)\}$.

Now, if there is a complete SWF $\Phi$ such that $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient, then $\Phi(y^1)$ ranks $\mu^1$ strictly above $\mu^4$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi(y)$ ranks $\mu^1$ strictly above $\mu^4$. Similarly, $\Phi(y^2)$ ranks $\mu^2$ strictly above $\mu^1$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi(y)$ ranks $\mu^2$ strictly above $\mu^1$.

Further, and again similarly, $\Phi(y^3)$ ranks $\mu^3$ strictly above $\mu^2$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi(y)$ ranks $\mu^3$ strictly above $\mu^2$. Finally, $\Phi(y^4)$ ranks $\mu^4$ strictly above $\mu^3$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi(y)$ ranks $\mu^4$ strictly above $\mu^3$. But, then $\Phi(y)$ fails transitivity, showing that there does not exist a complete SWF with respect to which $\phi$ is efficient.

Observe that this above example relies on the existence of more houses than agents. We will use this example to prove a theorem for the case with $|H| > |I|$, and we will consider the case $|H| = |I|$ later. To do this, we introduce sequential dictatorships formally. A sequential dictatorship is a TTC mechanism $\psi^\sigma$ such that for all $\sigma \in \mathcal{M}$ for all $h, h' \in \mathcal{P}_\sigma$, $\psi^\sigma(h, h') = \phi(h, h')$. 
\( c_h(\sigma) = c_{h'}(\sigma) \), i.e. an unmatched agent owns all unmatched houses at \( \sigma \). For notational convenience, we will represent each \( c_h(\cdot) \) as \( c(\cdot) \). Sequential dictatorships turn out to be the class of Arrovian-efficient and individually strategy-proof mechanisms for this case:

**Theorem 2.** Suppose \(|H| > |I|\). A mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient with respect to a complete SWF if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship.

**Proof of Theorem 2.** If \(|I| = 1\), the theorem is trivially true. Suppose \(|I| \geq 2\).

( \( \implies \) ) Consider a mechanism \( \phi \) that is individually strategy-proof and efficient with respect to a complete Arrovian welfare function. By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, \( \phi \) is a trading cycles mechanism \( \psi_{c,b} \).

Fix an arbitrary preference profile \( \succ \in P \). We claim that at any round \( r \) of the algorithm \( \psi_{c,b} \), there is exactly one agent who controls all houses. We prove it in two steps. First, let us show that there cannot be two (or more) agents who each owns a house. By way of contradiction, suppose that some agent \( 1 \) controls house \( A \) and some other agent \( 2 \) controls house \( B \) in round \( r \).

Suppose \( \sigma \) is the submatching created by the TC algorithm for \( \psi_{c,b} \) before round \( r \) at \( \succ \). Fix house \( C \in \{A, B\} \) as an unmatched house at \( \sigma \). Consider four auxiliary preference profiles \( \succ^\ell \in P \) that all share the following properties: (i) each agent matched under \( \sigma \) ranks houses under \( \succ^\ell \), \( \ell = 1, \ldots, 4 \), in the same way they rank them under \( \succ \), (ii) each agent \( i \) unmatched at \( \sigma \) and different from agents \( 1 \) and \( 2 \) ranks a unique \( \sigma \)-unmatched house \( h_i \notin \{A, B, C\} \cup H_\sigma \) as his first choice (such a unique house exists as \(|H| > |I|\)), and (iii) agents \( 1 \) and \( 2 \) each ranks all houses other than \( A, B, C \) lower than \( A, B, C \). In particular, the four profiles differ only in how agents \( 1 \) and \( 2 \) rank houses \( A, B, C \): the ranking of \( A, B, C \) is the same as in the four preference profiles of Example 3 above. Notice that

\[
\psi_{c,b}[^\ell] = \sigma \cup \mu^\ell \cup \{(i, h_i)\}_{i \in I_{\sigma} - \{1,2\}},
\]

where \( \mu^\ell \) are defined as in Example 3 above. Furthermore, the same argument we used in the example shows that there can be no SWF that ranks all four \( \mu^\ell \), is transitive, and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Hence, there is no complete SWF that makes \( \psi_{c,b} \) efficient, a contradiction that implies that there cannot be two agents who own houses in a round of the algorithm.

As \( \psi_{c,b} \) never allows two owners in a round of the algorithm. By Corollary 1 and Remark 1, there are no brokers in any round, either. Hence, in each round of the algorithm there is a single agent who controls (and owns) all houses. That means that \( \psi_{c,b} \) is a sequential dictatorship.
Consider a sequential dictatorship $\psi^c$. We construct a complete SWF $\Phi$ such that $\psi^c$ is efficient with respect to $\Phi$. Under $\Phi$ any two matchings are ranked according to preferences of the first-round dictator; if he is indifferent then the matchings are ranked according to the preferences of the second-round dictator, etc. Formally, for any $\succ \in P$ and any two distinct $\mu, \nu \in M$, let $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$ if and only if there exists $k \in \{1, \ldots, |I|\}$ such that $\mu(i_1) = \nu(i_1)$, ..., $\mu(i_{k-1}) = \nu(i_{k-1})$, and agent $i_k$ strictly prefers $\mu(i_k)$ over $\nu(i_k)$, where agents $i_1, \ldots, i_k$ are defined recursively: $i_1 = c(\emptyset)$, and in general $i_\ell = c(\{(i_1, \mu(i_1)), \ldots, (i_{\ell-1}, \mu(i_{\ell-1}))\})$ for $\ell = 1, \ldots, k$. It is straightforward to verify that $\Phi$ is a complete SWF and that $\psi^c$ is efficient with respect to $\Phi$. QED

Next we turn our attention to what happens when $|H| = |I|$. The above argument relies on the fact that there exists one extra house that can be used to regulate the ownership of all houses in any round of the algorithm. Suppose $|H| = |I|$. Then we can modify the argument in the proof and obtain a slightly different result. For this purpose we introduce a new class of mechanisms slightly larger than sequential dictatorships.

An almost sequential dictatorship is a TTC mechanism $\psi^c$ such that for all $\sigma \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $|H_\sigma| \neq 2$ we have $c_h(\sigma) = c_{h'}(\sigma)$ for all $h, h' \in \mathcal{H}_\sigma$.

Therefore, only mechanisms that are not sequential dictatorships in this class are mechanisms that assign to different owners to each of the houses when only two houses (and hence, two agents) are left, but otherwise a single agent owns all houses.

Our third result is as follows:

**Theorem 3.** A mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient with respect to a complete SWF if and only if it is an almost sequential-dictatorship.

First, we modify Example 3 and show that why an agent cannot own multiple houses while one other agent owns a house, and then we show in two examples that why three agents each cannot simultaneously control a house under a TC mechanism that is efficient with respect to a complete SCF. We will use these three examples in proving Theorem 3.

**Example 4.** When $|H| = |I| = 3$, an agent cannot own two houses while another agent owns the third house: Let $\phi$ be a top-trading-cycles mechanism in which agent 1 owns house $A$, agent 2 owns houses $B$ and $C$, and hence, agent 3 does not control any house. Consider 5 preference profiles $\succ, \succ^1, \succ^2, \succ^3, \succ^4$ as in Example 3. Suppose the preferences of agents 1 and 2 are exactly the same as in Example 3 under the respective profiles, while
agent 3 has the same arbitrarily fixed preference relation \( \succ_3 \equiv \succ_3^1 \equiv \ldots \equiv \succ_3^4 \). Denote

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu^1 &= \phi[\succ^1] = \{(1, B), (2, C), (3, A)\}, \\
\mu^2 &= \phi[\succ^2] = \{(1, C), (2, B), (3, A)\}, \\
\mu^3 &= \phi[\succ^3] = \{(1, C), (2, A), (3, B)\}, \\
\mu^4 &= \phi[\succ^4] = \{(1, A), (2, C), (3, B)\}.
\end{align*}
\]

Using the exact same argument as in Example 3, we establish that \( \Phi (\succ) \) fails transitivity, showing that there does not exist a complete SWF with respect to which \( \phi \) is efficient.

**Example 5.** When \(|H| = |I| = 3\), one agent cannot control a house while the others each own a house: Let \( \phi \) be a top-trading-cycles mechanism in which agent 1 owns house \( A \), agent 2 owns house \( B \), and agent 3 controls house \( C \). We will show that there is no complete SWF such that \( \phi \) is Arrovian efficient.

Consider the preference profile

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & 2 & 3 \\
B & C & A \\
C & A & B \\
A & B & C
\end{array}
\]

Consider also the following three additional preference profiles

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & 2 & 3 \\
B & C & B \\
C & A & : \\
A & B & C
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & 2 & 3 \\
C & C & A \\
A & : & B \\
B & : & C
\end{array}
\]

Regardless of whether agent 3 owns or brokers house \( C \), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu^1 &= \phi[\succ^1] = \{(1, A), (2, C), (3, B)\}; \\
\mu^2 &= \phi[\succ^2] = \{(1, C), (2, B), (3, A)\}; \\
\mu^3 &= \phi[\succ^3] = \{(1, B), (2, A), (3, C)\}.
\end{align*}
\]

If there is a complete SWF \( \Phi \) such that \( \phi \) is Arrovian efficient, then \( \Phi (\succ^1) \) ranks \( \mu^1 \) strictly above \( \mu^3 \), and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that \( \Phi (\succ) \) ranks \( \mu^1 \) strictly above \( \mu^3 \). Similarly, \( \Phi (\succ^2) \) ranks \( \mu^2 \) strictly above \( \mu^1 \), and, by the independence
of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi (\succ)$ ranks $\mu^2$ strictly above $\mu^1$. Further, and again similarly, $\Phi (\succ^3)$ ranks $\mu^3$ strictly above $\mu^2$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi (\succ)$ ranks $\mu^3$ strictly above $\mu^2$. Then $\Phi (\succ)$ fails transitivity, showing that there does not exist a complete SWF with respect to which $\phi$ is efficient.

**Example 6.** When $|H| = |I| = 3$, there cannot be three brokers: Let $\phi$ be a top-trading-cycles mechanism in which agent 1 brokers house $A$, agent 2 brokers house $B$, and agent 3 brokers house $C$. We will show that there is no complete SWF such that $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient.

$$\succ = \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ B & B & C \\ A & A & B \\ C & C & A \end{array}$$

Consider also the following three additional preference profiles

$$\succ^1 = \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ A & B & C \\ C & A & B \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{array} \quad \succ^2 = \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ B & B & C \\ A & C & A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{array} \quad \succ^3 = \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ B & A & B \\ C & C & A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{array}$$

Denote

$$\mu^1 = \phi [\succ^1] = \{(1, A), (2, B), (3, C)\};$$
$$\mu^2 = \phi [\succ^2] = \{(1, B), (2, C), (3, A)\};$$
$$\mu^3 = \phi [\succ^3] = \{(1, C), (2, A), (3, B)\}.$$  

If there is a complete SWF $\Phi$ such that $\phi$ is Arrovian efficient, then $\Phi (\succ^1)$ ranks $\mu^1$ strictly above $\mu^3$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi (\succ)$ ranks $\mu^1$ strictly above $\mu^3$. Similarly, $\Phi (\succ^2)$ ranks $\mu^2$ strictly above $\mu^1$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi (\succ)$ ranks $\mu^2$ strictly above $\mu^1$. Further, and again similarly, $\Phi (\succ^3)$ ranks $\mu^3$ strictly above $\mu^2$, and, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives, this implies that $\Phi (\succ)$ ranks $\mu^3$ strictly above $\mu^2$. Then $\Phi (\succ)$ fails transitivity, showing that there does not exist a complete SWF with respect to which $\phi$ is efficient.

**Proof of Theorem 3.** If $|H| > |I|$, it follows from Theorem 2. So suppose $|H| = |I|$. If $|I| = 1$, the theorem is trivially true. So suppose $|I| > 1:

( \implies )\) Consider a mechanism $\phi$ that is individually strategy-proof and efficient with respect to a complete Arrovian welfare function. By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, $\phi$ is a
trading cycles mechanism $\psi^{c,b}$.

Fix $\succ \in \mathbf{P}$. We claim that at any round $r$ of the algorithm for $\psi^{c,b}$, there is exactly one agent who controls all houses whenever $|T_\sigma| > 2$. We prove it in three steps (in accordance with Examples 4-6). Let $\sigma$ be the submatching created by the algorithm $\psi^{c,b}$ before round $r$ for $\succ$.

- First, we show that an agent cannot own two houses while another agent owns a third house: By way of contradiction, suppose that some agent 1 owns house $A$ and agent 2 owns houses $B$ and $C$ in round $r$. Then there exists an agent 3 who does not control any house at round $r$ as $|H| = |I|$. Consider four auxiliary preference profiles $\succ^\ell$ that all share the following properties: (i) each agent matched under $\sigma$ ranks houses under $\succ^\ell$, $\ell = 1, \ldots, 4$, in the same way they rank them under $\succ$, (ii) each agent $i$ unmatched at $\sigma$ and different from agents 1, 2, 3 ranks a unique $\sigma$-unmatched house $h_i \not\in \{A, B, C\} \cup H_\sigma$ as his first choice (such a unique house exists as $|H| = |I|$), (iii) agents 1 and 2 each ranks all houses other than $A, B, C$ lower than $A, B, C$, and (iv) agent 3’s preferences are the same as $\succ_i$ under all four profiles. In particular, the four profiles differ only in how agents 1 and 2 rank houses $A, B, C$: the ranking of $A, B, C$ is the same as in the four preference profiles of Example 4 above. Notice that

$$\psi^{c,b}[\succ^\ell] = \sigma \cup \mu^\ell \cup \{(i, h_i)\}_{i \in I_\sigma \setminus \{1, 2, 3\}},$$

where $\mu^\ell$ are defined as in Example 4 above. Furthermore, the same argument we used in Example 4 shows that there can be no SWF that ranks all four $\mu^\ell$, is transitive, and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Hence, there is no complete SWF that makes $\psi^{c,b}$ efficient, a contradiction.

- Next, we show that one agent cannot control a house while at least two others each own a house in round $r$: Suppose to the contrary, agent 1 owns house $A$, agent 2 owns house $B$, and agent 3 controls house $C$ in round $r$. Consider three auxiliary preference profiles $\succ^\ell$ that all share the following properties: (i) each agent matched under $\sigma$ ranks houses under $\succ^\ell$, $\ell = 1, 2, 3$, in the same way they rank them under $\succ$, (ii) each agent $i$ unmatched at $\sigma$ and different from agents 1, 2, 3 ranks a unique $\sigma$-unmatched house $h_i \not\in \{A, B, C\} \cup H_\sigma$ as his first choice (such a unique house exists as $|H| = |I|$), and (iii) agents 1, 2, 3 each ranks all houses other than $A, B, C$ lower than $A, B, C$ and the ranking of $A, B, C$ is the same as in the three preference profiles of Example 5 above. Observe that

$$\psi^{c,b}[\succ^\ell] = \sigma \cup \mu^\ell \cup \{(i, h_i)\}_{i \in I_\sigma \setminus \{1, 2, 3\}},$$

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where $\mu^\ell$ are defined as in Example 5 above. Furthermore, the same argument we used in Example 5 shows that there can be no SWF that ranks all three $\mu^\ell$, is transitive, and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Hence, there is no complete SWF that makes $\psi^{c,b}$ efficient, a contradiction.

Finally, using a variant of Example 6 we show that there cannot be multiple brokers at round $r$ (as multiple brokers can only occur with 3 agents and 3 houses, where each agent brokers a distinct house): Suppose not. Then consider three auxiliary preference profiles $\succ^\ell$ that all share the following properties: (i) each agent matched under $\sigma$ ranks houses under $\succ^\ell$, $\ell = 1, 2, 3$, in the same way they rank them under $\succ$ and agents 1, 2, 3, who are the only remaining unmatched agents, each ranks all houses other than $A, B, C$ lower than $A, B, C$ and the ranking of $A, B, C$ is the same as in the three preference profiles of Example 6 above. Notice that

$$\psi^{c,b}[\succ^\ell] = \sigma \cup \mu^\ell,$$

where $\mu^\ell$ are defined as in Example 6 above. Furthermore, the same argument we used in Example 6 shows that there can be no SWF that ranks all three $\mu^\ell$, is transitive, and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Hence, there is no complete SWF that makes $\psi^{c,b}$ efficient, a contradiction.

Thus, a single agent owns all houses at round $r$ when $\sigma$ is fixed for $|I_\sigma| > 2$ (by Corollary 1 and Remark 1).

This means that $\psi^{c,b}$ is an almost sequential dictatorship as all TC mechanisms restricted to only two agents is an almost sequential dictatorship.

($\Leftarrow$) Consider an almost sequential dictatorship $\psi^c$. If $\psi^c$ is a sequential dictatorship then the proof of Theorem 2 works. So suppose it is not a sequential dictatorship. Hence, $|H| = |I|$. We construct a complete SWF $\Phi$ such that $\psi^c$ is efficient with respect to $\Phi$. Under $\Phi$ any two matchings are ranked according to preferences of the first-round dictator; if he is indifferent then the matchings are ranked according to the preferences of the second-round dictator, etc until only two agents remain unmatched. At this round let 1 and 2 be the two and $A$ and $B$ be the two houses remaining unmatched. Observe that there are only two matchings, $\mu$ and $\nu$, which have all the agents’ assignments the same but the last two: in one 1 gets $A$ and 2 gets $B$, and in the other vice versa. Then one of these two matching is equal to $\psi^c[\succ']$, where $\succ'$ ranks the assignment of any agent other than 1 and 2 in $\mu$ (or equivalently $\nu$) as his first choice, and for 1 and 2, the new preferences are the same as the original ones under $\succ$. We rank $\psi^c[\succ'] \in \{\mu, \nu\}$ before the other one under $\Phi(\succ')$. 

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Formally, for all $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, let sequential dictators $i_1, \ldots, i_{|I|-2}$ be defined as $i_1 = c_h(\emptyset)$ for all $h \in H$, and in general, $i_\ell = c_h(\{(i_1, \mu(i_1)), \ldots, (i_{\ell-1}, \mu(i_{\ell-1}))\})$ for all $h \in H - \{\mu(i_1), \ldots, \mu(i_{\ell-1})\}$ and $\ell = 1, \ldots, k$; then for all $\nu \in \mathcal{M} - \{\mu\}$, we say $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$ if one of the following two conditions hold:

1. there exists $k \in \{1, \ldots, |I| - 2\}$ such that $\mu(i_1) = \nu(i_1), \ldots, \mu(i_{k-1}) = \nu(i_{k-1})$, and $\mu(i_k) \succ_{i_k} \nu(i_k)$;

or

2. for all $\ell \in \{1, \ldots, |I| - 2\}$, $\mu(i_\ell) = \nu(i_\ell)$, and for $\succ' \in \mathcal{P}$ where each $i_\ell$ ranks $\mu(i_\ell)$ first while the remaining two agents have the same preferences as in $\succ$, we have $\psi^c[\succ'] = \mu$.

By construction, $\Phi$ is complete, antisymmetric, and transitive. Moreover, it satisfies Pareto. To see that it also satisfies IIA. Consider two distinct matchings, $\mu$ and $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$, and $\succ \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$. Also consider another profile $\tilde{\succ} \in \mathcal{P}$ such that each agent $i$’s preference over the two matching assignments is the same in $\tilde{\succ}$ as in $\succ$. If $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$ because of condition 1 above, then condition 1 continues to hold for $\tilde{\succ}$ and thus $\mu \Phi(\tilde{\succ}) \nu$. On the other hand, if $\mu \Phi(\succ) \nu$ because of condition 2 above, then $\mu$ and $\nu$ only differ in how the last two agents are assigned the remaining two houses. Hence, the profile constructed to check condition 2 for $\mu \Phi(\tilde{\succ}) \nu$, which we refer to as $\tilde{\succ}'$, would lead to $\psi^c[\tilde{\succ}'] = \mu$ because:

1. the first $|I| - 2$ dictators would still get their $\mu$ assignments in the first $|I| - 2$ rounds of the TC algorithm for $\psi^c[\tilde{\succ}]$, and

2. thus, the assignment of remaining two agents under $\psi^c[\tilde{\succ}]$ would be identical with that under $\mu$ as the relative ranking of their assignments under $\mu$ and $\nu$ are identical both in $\succ$ and $\tilde{\succ}$, and the ranking of the other houses do not matter for finding the outcome of the almost serial dictatorship.

Thus, $\mu \Phi(\tilde{\succ}) \nu$ showing $\Phi$ satisfies IIA. QED

References


